H - Electricity – 04 – L
Patent
H - Electricity
04
L
H04L 29/06 (2006.01) H04L 12/28 (2006.01) H04L 12/56 (2006.01)
Patent
CA 2481682
The present invention involves the recognition that since an eavesdropper listening adjacent to a wireless LAN is likely to be mobile and operating on a short time cycle, he himself is likely to be wirelessly transmitting his test message. Consequently, the present invention provides the combination of apparatus for eavesdropping within an area layer adjacent to and surrounding the LAN area periphery for potential wireless transmissions of an intruder having a lower frequency within a level below the LAN frequency and addressed to the network location of any one of the computer terminals in the LAN; and an implementation responsive to said eavesdropping means for changing the encryption code of said encrypted wireless transmission upon the eavesdropping detection of a wireless transmission of said lower frequency addressed to a network location of one of the terminals in said LAN. There is the recognition that there are several factors contributing to the success of the process of the invention. It is likely that the intruder must send his message at a lower frequency than the 2.4 GHz frequency of the LAN area transmissions because the intruder will probably have to reach a base station tower over a longer distance or range than the adjacent target wireless LAN facility. This insures that the eavesdropping of the present invention will be at a lower frequency and, thus, not interfered with by the transmissions within the LAN.
Si un écouteur clandestin d'écoute adjacente à un LAN sans fil est susceptible de se déplacer en agissant sur un court cycle de temps, il est susceptible de transmettre sans fil son message test. Par conséquent, la présente invention fournit l'association de l'appareil d'écoute clandestine dans une couche zone adjacente à et entourant la périphérie de la zone LAN pour les éventuelles transmissions sans fil d'un intrus ayant une basse fréquence inférieure à la fréquence LAN et adressé à la localisation réseau d'un terminal d'ordinateur quelconque du LAN, et d'une application en réaction à ce moyen d'écoute clandestine pour changer le code de chiffrement de cette transmission sans fil codée suite à la détection d'une écoute clandestine d'une transmission sans fil de cette basse fréquence adressée à une localisation de réseau d'un terminal quelconque de ce LAN. Plusieurs facteurs contribuent au succès du processus de l'invention. Il est probable que l'intrus doive envoyer son message à une fréquence inférieure à la fréquence 2.4 GHz des transmissions de la zone LAN puisqu'il doit probablement atteindre une tour station de base sur une distance ou étendue plus grande que celle de la fonction LAN sans fil cible adjacente. Cela garantit que l'écoute clandestine de la présente invention se fera à une basse fréquence et donc ne sera pas parasitée par les transmissions internes au LAN.
Mcbrearty Gerald Francis
Mullen Shawn Patrick
Shieh Johnny Meng-Han
Tesauro James Stanley
International Business Machines Corporation
Smart & Biggar
Trend Micro Incorporated
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